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Thursday, February 21, 2019

Cultural Awareness in an Asymmetric Environment

I deal all experienced phalanx leadership, both noncommissioned and commissioned, envision the splendor of knowing both facet of the enemy and their environment. Throughout history, we vex studied, witnessed and experienced great examples of the use of ethnic fellowship during combat operations. Lieutenant Colonel T. E. Lawrence (of Arabia) of the British Army documented his experiences while living among the Arabic people. He lettered about their society and agri farming in hostel to improve his array expertise (McFate, 2004).With constantly changing interests, influences and enemy TTPs in todays asymmetric environment, soldiers on all levels are practically foc utilize on new strategies, equipment and tactics and unintentionally lose focus on the immensity of cultural sensory faculty. In todays contemporary operation environment, cultural understanding and fellowship is a draw element to successful peace treaty operations. This paper will stress the assume for intensifying cultural awarfareeness preparation in preparation for todays asymmetric war and will emphasize the effectiveness of this regulation of war.Cultural Awareness in an Asymmetric Environment Any WWII or Korean War veteran(prenominal) whoremaster probably tell you how the phrase combat operations had a completely different connotation back in their day. Where employments of the past whitethorn have been focused on manpower, fire superiority and organise, today we are focused on variables like sociological demographics, politics and economy. Currently, U. S. sucks are busy in asymmetric warfare where the insurgents are adapting their strategies to avoid the direct booking and attempting to exploit the weaknesses of U. S. forces.The insurgents have the upper-hand they know the customs, geography, influences and people and are able to maneuver unnoticed. To combat this, we have adjusted our training by implementing cultural familiarization in pre-mobilization training and inserting COIN philosophy into many leadership courses. How incessantly I represent that Soldiers on all levels, besides especially the junior leaders and tacticians who are often engaged in the midst of the topical anesthetic populace, do not fully understand the value and second/third coif effects of decently implementing this principle of warfare.Today, much than ever, we need to focus our training on cultural awareness and employ this knowledge to reverse the leaning of the insurgency exploiting our cultural ignorance. Argument Just as a college football coach studies the footage of their opponents previous games we need to study the norms, interests, relationships and socio-political patterns of our operating(a) environment. In the last decade, we have taken measures to emphasize this principle of war but intimately significantly the publication of FM 3-24 has developed doctrine to defeat counterinsurgents with lessons l stimulateed in combat.It teaches the impor tance of cultural awareness in an asymmetric environment and stresses to avoid rattling(a) our ideology of what we think is ordinary upon a foreign society (2006, p. 1-15). Todays COE demands a more robust pre-mobilization training package on the culture, language, geography and anthropology. Training for this principle of warfare has been trivialized to higher-level familiarization of COIN doctrine and lower-level check-the-block pre-mobilization training.We need comprehensive training that involves every Soldier and incorporates modern studies with scenario based exercises. Sergeant Elkhamri, a U. S. Army translating program that spent 18 month with a Special Forces unit in Iraq, explained that the way to increase the Iraki support in our fight against terrorism is to improve the quality and increase the quantity of pre-mobilization cultural awareness training. He further emphasizes how the we cannot expect deploying Soldiers to get a full understanding of Iraqi culture in a 2 hour PowerPoint class (2007, p. 110).The Filipino Insurrection The Filipino Insurrection is one of the strongest examples of how the lack of cultural paying attention and understanding can render significantly negative effects on military operations. From the the Statesn stand point, the Philippine Insurrection should have been a quick and easy conflict. Originally, the U. S. deployed with 20,000 wads in order to quickly squish the insurrection. After the realization that the resistance was not going to collapse quickly, troop strength doubled, tripled and finally peaked at 74,000 by the end of the conflict (Wikipedia, 2009) .In short, this stemmed from the U. S. underestimating the importance of cultural understanding by disregardless the Filiopino culture. The U. S. likewise demostrated that it was their duty to rescue the Filipino people by imposing American democracy upon them. This understandingset, which was evident among U. S. military leadership in the Philippines, is well-nightimes apparent to this day. The Philippine Insurrection is one of the lowest points in U. S. military history. The Filipinos were often described by American military and media as uncivilized, deuced savages. The U. S. ilitary strategy was executed with no consideration towards the local populace.American Soldiers tortured, damage and even decapitated Filipino troops. There were reports of U. S. Soldiers shooting surrendering Filipino troops and burning entire villages to the ground (Wikipedia, 2009). Picture these atrocities happening in America to Americans by a foreign military force. I would bet that we would have an enormous insurgent force of enraged Americans. Human nature dictates that the Philippine people would react the same way, and they did. The insurgency grew as word feast of the atrocities.Agoncillo described how the Filipino troops would exceed American brutality on most prisoners of war. He told stories how ears and noses were cut off and salt appli ed to the wounds some other reports described captured U. S. Soldiers being buried alive (Wikipedia, 1990). This cause and effect motorcycle was mutually destructive in the end, both sides were blatantly breaking the Laws of War. conjuration uninfected was one American that understood the effectiveness of cultural understanding. He was a former American soldier that served as an officer in the Philippine Constabulary and led foreign autochthonal troops in combat.His experiences served as a perfect example of the positive effects achieved by applying cultural understanding. In 1928 he wrote a book describing how he create a unified and highly effective combat unit of indigenous people that were both Muslim and Christian. These specialized squads would hunt d have the insurgents into their own domain and defeat them in battle. Some of the keys to his success were emphasizing super C soldier skills, trusting the integrity of his troops, treating his subordinates and their cultur es with respect and adapting proven army methods to the indigen culture.He became fluent in Spanish and lived among his soldiers and the native people (2009, Dimarco). White was hugely successful in overcoming the insurgency by understanding their culture and adapting his knowledge of combat operations and tactics to fit his operating environment. carrying out Iraqi Freedom The roots of the problems we face in Iraq stemmed from the strategical level. McFate, explained how some policy makers misunderstood the tribal nature of the Iraqi culture and assumed that the government would remain stable even after ibn Talal Husseins regime was overthrown.Consequentially, without any governmental structure the tribes assumed fake and once the Bathists lost their power, the tribal network became the backbone of the insurgency. The Iraqi tribal insurgency was born from American cultural ignorance (McFate, 2004, p. 44). Cultural fault continued to be our weakness with the misinterpretation o f certain symbols and gestures. American forces often associated the black flag as the opposite of surrender but among the Shia world it is a apparitional symbol.Consequently, many Shia who flew the black were shot unnecessarily for displaying their religious beliefs. Another example is how the American signal for stop was often misinterpreted since this gesture means welcome in Iraq as you can imagine, this resulted in catastrophe as well (2004, p. 44). In 2006, Elkhamri witnessed numerous appointments of powerful political figures only when based family-ties and political affiliations. He met Iraqi Commanders who were promoted from lieutenant to lieutenant colonel altogether for political reasons.Naturally, these shady antics did not go over well with the local populace. With a better understanding of the social-political framework, leaders could prevent these situations and earn the trust and respect of the community (2007, p. 111). Inversely, understanding the culture and society of your COE can positively impact military operations. By recognizing that pre-existing social structures were key to political stabilization, British Brigadier Andrew Kennett implemented historical lessons wise to(p) by adjusting to local cultures and understanding the inner workings of the tribal hierarchy.He learned that the most important element of the Iraqi society is the tribe and their supporters and ascertained the tribal relationship between currency and loyalty. Knowing this, he constitute tribal leaders to the local councils and gave them money to distribute. By doing this, he clothe the sheiks and gained favor with the local tribes (McFate, 2007, p. 45). General Odierno understood how the structure of any insurgency everlastingly mirrors the structure of the indigenous society with this notion he tasked two junior news program analysts to construct a chart in order to locate Saddam.By identifying, depicting and tracking key figures nterrelationships, social status, and last-known locations, this intelligence led the 4th ID troops directly to Saddam Hussein (McFate, 2007, p. 45). This spell point in the war stemmed from the leaderships knowledge of the Iraqi society and culture. Counter Argument There are some that believe cultural understanding is over rated and over emphasized. In some military subcultures, fixed emotions and apathy towards your enemies culture and interests correlates to strength, courage and fearlessness. Some argue that the Warrior Ethos contradicts with cultural understanding and COIN doctrine.Many years ago, my friend SSG Delagarza banteringly said, My definition of hearts and minds is two in the heart, one in the mind and yes, we all laughed because that was part of being in that subculture. There are situations where this hardened mindset is essential to mission success, but just as we need to subscribe to the right coat of arms for each planned target, we need to select the proper approach for each milit ary operation and situation. Selecting the proper weaponry and the proper approach is a key decision that is based on thorough analysis of every aspect of your enemy and AO.Cultural knowledge of your enemy goes hand in hand with the strategy and tactics used to defeat them. A former commander and one of the hardest Rangers I ever met used to always tell us, You got to be hard AND smart. It was a straightforward little phrase that we usually ignored but its always stuck with me. Now that I have grown as an NCO and leader, I realize what he was saying. There are times to use your brawn by showing overwhelming aggression and firepower but there are also times to use your intellect by employing the most efficient methods to divvy up a situation.As a young first sergeant I learned the hard way. There were times my hard charging methods of demanding battalion cater NCOs to do their job and fix the problem may have worked, but in due course I realized that I was destroying captious re lationships and losing all rapport with supporting elements. The secondary effects were evident by the lack willing support from these same staff sections for months to follow. Ironically, the trickle-down effect finally affected the ones I was so adamantly fighting for, my Soldiers.Conclusion I believe the U. S. will always overcome any military thwarter with our verwhelming land, sea and air superiority, advanced intelligence, technology, weaponry and training but at what cost? In todays asymmetric environment, direct treat may not always be the best option. The finesse of properly executed cultural diplomacy may be an effective force multiplier. There is a significant need to train every Soldier on effectively implementing cultural understanding, especially at the lowest level. With an advanced understanding of our COEs culture, society, geography and anthropology we could achieve success swiftly, efficiently and most importantly with considerably less casualties.Referenceshtt ps//en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philippine%E2%80%93American_Warhttp//louisdimarco.com/Occupations/Reviewbulletsandbolos.pdf

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